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Abstract 
This paper examines the mathematical abilities of 15-year olds in a range of 
countries which participated in the 2003 cycle of the OCED’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). Utilising information on the scores obtained 
by individual students in the mathematical part of the PISA assessment, we use a 
range of indicators from the literature on inequality and poverty to evaluate the 
“mathematical performance” of participating countries. Since data from PISA 
contained a wealth of information on the circumstances of the students, in terms of 
their home and school environment, we identify, and examine the relative influence 
of, factors which serve to enhance the mathematical performance of students in the 
PISA assessment.  
                                                 
* School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, BT37 0QB, Northern 
Ireland, United Kingdom (MF.Bailey@ulster.ac.uk).   
+ Corresponding author. School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, BT37 
0QB, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom (VK.Borooah@ulster.ac.uk). 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Editor and to an anonymous referee for valuable comments.  
1.  Introduction 
An interesting - but, arguably, not sufficiently appreciated – feature of the labour 
market is the positive association between a person’s earnings and whether he or she 
had studied mathematics at school to an advanced level (Kenny et. al., 1979, Dolton 
and Vignoles, 2000, McIntosh and Vignoles, 2000). Dolton & Vignoles (2000, 2002) 
measured the returns an individual obtained from having an A-level in Mathematics (a 
Mathematics qualification taken in British schools at post-16 level) and found that the 
return became evident at a later, rather than earlier, stage of a person’s career; they 
argued that the return was due to employers observing that employees with A-level 
mathematics had higher levels of productivity compared to those who did not have 
this qualification.  They concluded that individuals with an A-level in mathematics 
earned 7%-10% more than similarly educated workers without this qualification, even 
after controlling for the initial ability of these individuals. 
In a similar vein, Jenkins et al (2003) found that, for women, mathematical ability 
was particularly important in determining which of them would undertake lifelong 
learning that would lead to a qualification – an important consideration given the 
emphasis on lifelong leaning in recent UK government policy thinking such as the 
“new skills agenda”.  More recently, Kounine et. al. (2008) have bemoaned the 
decline of mathematics in the United Kingdom and argued that winning the battle of 
the “maths economy” will be crucial to the UK’s future economic success.
 1 
Murnane et al (1995) and Ingram & Neumann (2006) while supporting this claim, 
also presented evidence that, in the United States, mathematical qualifications had 
become increasingly important in determining wage rates: Ingram & Neumann (2006) 
                                                 
1 For a contrary view on the usefulness of mathematics see Jenkins (2008). 
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found that the return to mathematical and verbal ability nearly doubled between 1980 
and 1998. 
What benefits the individual also benefits the economy: at a macroeconomic level, 
studies making use of international school test score data have found a link between 
mathematical ability and the economic growth of the state (Hanushek and Kimko, 
2000). This linkage has been recognised by policy makers.  For example, Alan 
Greenspan giving testimony before the Committee on Education and the Workforce of 
the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2004 noted that: 
“Research on wealth creation in both emerging and developed nations strongly 
suggests that it is the knowledge and the skill of our population interacting 
under our rule of law that determine our real incomes… A study conducted in 
1995 revealed that, although our fourth-grade students were above average in 
both math and science, by the time they reached their last year of high school 
they had fallen well below the international average.” (Greenspan, 2004, 
emphasis added).  
Given the importance of the level of mathematical ability of a country’s 
population, in determining both individual life chances and also macroeconomic 
performance, this paper asks two broad questions: 
(i)  How do levels of mathematical ability differ between countries and are 
levels of inter-country inequality in mathematical ability susceptible to 
analysis using the tools of inequality theory? 
(ii)   What are the factors that influence such ability and, in exercising such 
influence, what is the relative strength of the relevant factors?     
We answer these questions using data from the OCED’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) which is one of a range of trans-national 
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tests of student ability.
2 PISA is a collaborative effort, involving all OECD countries 
and a significant number of partner countries, to measure how well 15 year students 
“are prepared to meet the challenges of today’s knowledge society”.   The PISA 2003 
assessments consist of paper-and-pencil tests and the following domains are tested: (i) 
mathematical literacy; (ii) reading literacy; (iii) scientific literacy. 
On the basis of these tests, each of 276,150 students in 41 countries was assigned 
a score for mathematics, reading, and science.  In addition to this information about 
how well students fared in their assessments, the PISA data contains a wealth of 
information on the circumstances surrounding a student.  These relate to inter alia: (i) 
his/her personal circumstances, living arrangements etc; (ii) parental attributes 
relating to education, class; (iii) home possessions and environment relating to books, 
computers, internet, place to study; (iv) school circumstances relating to amount of 
instruction, relationship with teachers, type of school etc. 
The issue of inter-country differences in education achievement has been 
investigated by Maas and Criel (1982) who estimated Gini coefficients based on 
enrolment data for 16 East African countries and, more recently, by Thomas et. al. 
(2001, 2002) who studied inequality in educational attainments for 140 countries. The 
latter set of papers developed the concept of education Gini and argued that this could 
be used as an indicator of welfare complementing average educational, health, 
nutritional, and income attainments. In so doing, Thomas et. al.. (2001, 2002) were 
motivated by Sen’s (1999) observation that concern with equity should not be 
confined to just income inequality but, indeed, should be extended to embrace all the 
dimensions which impinge on a person’s ability to function effectively in society. 
                                                 
2 See Hansen & Vignoles (2005) and Brown et al (2007) for a discussion of how PISA 
compares to other assessments. 
  3 
Machin and Vignoles (2004) have studied educational inequality in the UK from 
the perspective of socio-economic groups. Comparing two cohorts of individuals, 
born in 1958 and 1970, they found that the links between educational achievement 
and parental income / social class strengthened over this period so that the labour 
market success or failure of individuals became more closely connected to their 
parents income. This work is complemented by that of Galindo-Rueda et. al. (2004) 
who found that in UK higher education, even before the introduction of tuition fees, 
children from poorer neighbourhoods had become less likely to participate in higher 
education since 1994-95, as compared to children from richer neighbourhoods. 
In this paper we extend the contribution of Thomas et. al. (2001, 2002), to the 
study of educational inequality, in one respect. Following the work of Anand and Sen 
(1997) we argue that the average achievements of a country with respect to a 
particular welfare indicator –which in the case of this paper is “mathematical ability” 
as measured by PISA – should be tempered by considerations of inequality in the 
distribution of achievements between the individuals in the country’s population. 
Anand and Sen (1997) referred to the resultant indicators of achievement as being 
“equity sensitive”. In this paper we construct, for each country in the PISA sample, 
equity sensitive indicators of mathematical ability. 
The heart of the paper lies, however, in answering the latter questions relating to 
the factors which enhance mathematical ability. Since, as noted above, data from 
PISA contained a wealth of information on the circumstances of the students, 
particularly in terms of their home and school environment, we identify, and examine 
the relative influence of, factors which serve to enhance the mathematical 
performance of students in the PISA assessment.   
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The determinants of the factors underlying educational achievement have been the 
subject of several studies. Jenkins et. al. (1993) examined the determinants of lifelong 
learning and concluded that those who left school with O-level qualifications or 
higher were much more likely to undertake lifelong learning.  Okpala and Onocha 
(1988) examined the factors underlying student achievement in physics in Nigeria and 
examined the role of inter alia gender, home, interest in physics in shaping 
achievement in physics.      
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2.  Equity Sensitive Indicators of Student Assessment Scores 
In a paper prepared for the 1995 Human Development Report, Anand and Sen 
(1997) pointed out that a country's non-economic achievements were likely to be 
unequally distributed between subgroups of its population: for example, in terms of 
gender equality, which was the focus of their concern, the female literacy rate, or 
female life expectancy, was often lower than that for males.  In the face of such inter-
group inequality, they argued that a country's achievement with respect to a particular 
outcome should not be judged exclusively by its mean level of achievement (for 
example, by the average literacy rate for a country) but rather by the mean level 
adjusted to take account of inter-group differences in achievements.   
Anand and Sen (1997) proposed a method, based on Atkinson's (1970) seminal 
work on the relation between social welfare and inequality, for making such 
adjustments and they termed the resulting indicators equity sensitive indicators.  They 
further suggested that assessments of country achievements should be made on the 
basis of such equity sensitive indicators rather than, as was often the case, on the basis 
of its mean level of achievement.  This would, then, allow a comparison between two 
countries, one of which had a lower mean achievement level, but a more equitable 
distribution of achievement, than the other.
3  In this section we apply these ideas to 
the student assessment scores (SAS) - hereafter, simply, “scores” – in the PISA data.  
Suppose that X is the average score in a country where  i X  is the score of student i 
(i=1…N).  We know that, because of inequality in the distribution of scores between 
students, the average score of a country will not be achieved by all its students.   
                                                 
3 Anand and Sen (1997) compared the Honduras (with an average literacy rate of 75%, distributed 
between men and women as 78%, 73%) with China (with an average literacy rate of 80%, distributed 
between men and women as 92%, 68%) and asked which country should be regarded as having the 
"better" achievement with regard to literacy: China with a higher overall rate or the Honduras with 
greater gender equality? 
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Therefore, in assessing the SAS achievement of a country, by how much should we 
reduce its average SAS to take account of inequality in scores?   
The answer to this question depends on how averse we are to inequality.  In his 
seminal paper on income inequality, Atkinson (1970) argued that we (society) would 
be prepared to accept a reduction in average income, provided the lower income was 
equally distributed, from a higher average income which was unequally distributed.
4 
The size of this reduction depended upon our degree of "inequality aversion" which 
Atkinson (1970) measured by the value of a (inequality aversion) parameter, 0 ε ≥ .  
When 0 ε = , we are not at all averse to inequality implying that we would not be 
prepared to accept even the smallest reduction in average income in order to secure an 
equitable distribution. The degree of inequality aversion increases with the value of 
ε : the higher the value of ε , the more averse we would be to inequality and, in order 
to secure an equitable distribution of income, the greater the reduction in average 
income we would find acceptable. 
These ideas can, equally well, be applied to student assessment scores.  We 
can reduce the average score, X , of a country by the amount of inter-student 
inequality in scores to arrive at 
e X , a "group equity sensitive" score for the country, 
e X X ≤ .  We refer to
e X  as the equally distributed equivalent score.  The size of this 
reduction (as given by the difference,
e X X − ) depends upon our aversion to 
inequality: the lower our aversion to inequality, the smaller will be the difference and, 
in the extreme case in which there is no aversion to inequality ( 0 ε = ), there will be 
no difference between the average and the equity sensitive scores. Three special cases, 
contingent upon the value assumed byε , may be distinguished: 
                                                 
4 In the language of economics, the two situations would yield the same level of social welfare, i.e. be 
'welfare equivalent'. 
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1.  When  0 ε =  (no inequality aversion), 
e X  is the arithmetic mean of the 
student scores:
e X X =    
2.  When  1 ε = , 
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3.  When  2 ε = , 















  Table 1 shows the equity sensitive scores for each of the 41 countries in the 
PISA data, contingent upon the amount of inequality in the distribution of scores 
between all the 15 year olds in (the sample for) that country.  This table shows three 
separate rankings for the 41 countries: first, the ranking that resulted entirely from the 
average score of countries when intra-country inequality was deemed not to matter; 
second, the ranking that resulted when inequality aversion was measured by  1 ε =  or, 
in other words, the relevant average was measured by the geometric mean; lastly, the 
ranking that resulted when inequality aversion was measured by  2 ε =  or, in other 
words, the relevant average was measured by the harmonic mean. 
  Table 1 shows that the rankings changed only slightly from no inequality 
aversion to inequality aversion: the first 8 places were unchanged; Australia slipped 
from 11
th to 12
th place while Canada rose from 12
th to 11




st  under successively higher degrees of inequality aversion 
while Italy slipped from 24
th to 25
th place. In general, we can conclude that the use of 
equity-sensitive indicators did not add much to the rankings of countries by their 
average level of mathematical achievements.  
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3.  Explaining Mathematical Proficiency 
Pisa (2003) defined seven levels of proficiency in mathematics: level 1, for 
SAS ≤ 357.77; level 2, for 357.77 < SAS ≤ 420.07; level 3, for 420.07 < SAS ≤  
482.38;  level 4, for 482.38 < SAS ≤  554.68; level 5, for 554.68 < SAS ≤  606.99; 
level 6, for 606.99 < SAS ≤  669.3; level 7, for SAS > 669.3.  
Table 2 shows that Tunisia and Brazil (52 percent), Indonesia (51 percent), 
Uruguay (30 percent), Mexico (26 percent), Turkey (26 percent), Thailand (18 
percent), and Greece and Serbia (18 percent) had the largest proportion of students at 
the lowest level of proficiency in mathematics.  In all the other countries, less than 
one in ten students – and, in many countries, less than one in twenty students – were 
at the lowest proficiency level.   
At the other extreme, Table 3 shows that Hong Kong (32 percent), 
Netherlands and Belgium (27 percent), Liechtenstein and the Czech Republic (25 
percent), and Japan and Korea (24 percent) had the largest proportion of students at 
the two highest levels of mathematical proficiency.   
Table 4 details the results of a regression model which seeks to explaining the 
predicted Scores in Mathematics by using the socio-economic characteristics of the 
student and their family along with information about their education (both inside and 
outside the school environment) and a county-type control variable. 
The socio-economic characteristic explanatory variables for the student and the 
family comprise 
•  The age of the student: we would expect an older student to perform better 
in tests, ceteris paribus; however, it is worth pointing out that given that 
the students in the survey are fairly tightly clustered in terms of age with a 
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•  The type of family: single parent, a nuclear family (mother, father and 
children), mixed family or other. The traditional view would be that 
students who are members of a nuclear family would perform better in 
education. 
•  The level of parental education converted into years of schooling. Here we 
would expect that more schooling for the parent should improve the 
educational performance of the student.. 
•  Whether the language used by the family at home is the same as the 
language used for the test. It is plausible that those students using a 
language at home other than the test language would under-perform in a 
test conducted in the test language but it is also possible that such students 
may have a predisposition to working harder to overcome this 
disadvantage which will outlay the expectation of underperformance. 
•  Students with parents who are white collar workers (i.e. non-manual) 
should perform better than students whose parents who are blue collar 
workers (i.e. manual). Within these two groups, students with parents who 
are high skilled workers should perform better than students with parents 
who are low skilled workers. This would be consistent with results on 
socio-economic educational inequality reported by Machin and Vignoles 
(2004) and Galindo-Rueda et. al. (2004).  
The information about their education (both inside and outside the school 
environment) comprised the following items: 
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(i)  The minutes of mathematical instruction at School: these were categorised 
by us into four quartiles ranging from lowest to highest, with the highest 
quartile taken as the residual or base category. We would expect that the 
test score would rise as the amount of instruction increased. 
(ii) The interest in Mathematics: these were categorised by us into four 
quartiles ranging from lowest to highest, with the highest quartile taken as 
the residual or base category. We would expect that the test score to rise as 
the interest in Mathematics increased. 
(iii)The availability of computing resources at home: these were categorised 
by us into four quartiles ranging from lowest to highest, with the highest 
quartile taken as the residual or base category. We would expect that the 
test score rises as the availability of computing resources increases; this is 
both due to computers being of use for improving educational attainment 
and the presence of computers being a partial proxy for higher household 
income. 
(iv)  The availability of other resources at home (such as a quiet place to study): 
these were categorised by us into four quartiles ranging from lowest to 
highest, with the highest quartile taken as the residual or base category. 
We would expect the test score to rise as the availability of other resources 
at home increased. 
(v) The level of motivation: this was categorised by us into four quartiles 
ranging from lowest to highest, with the highest quartile taken as the 
residual or base category. We would expect that the test score to rise as the 
level of motivation increased. 
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(vi)  The level of discipline in the classroom, categorised by us into four 
quartiles ranging from lowest to highest, with the highest quartile taken as 
the residual or base category. We would expect that the test score to rise as 
the level of discipline in the classroom increased. 
(vii)  The use of different learning strategies. Here we are comparing the use 
of  elaboration learning strategies (which is the residual category - an 
example being to understand new concepts in mathematics by relating 
them to things already known) with memorisation learning strategies 
(example: learn the answers to problems off by heart) and control learning 
strategies (example: self testing as the students study, to see if they 
remember the work already done). Our a priori belief was that elaboration 
and control learning strategies were more conducive to a higher test score 
compared to memorisation strategies.  
With this background, we use the regression estimates shown in Table 4 to 
highlight the main findings.  
Country Effects.  One would expect that, after controlling for other variables, the 
country in which a student lived would influence his/her results. This is because the 
country of residence would capture the general level of resources available to 
residents and which would buttress the more specific variables pertaining to the 
individual students. Ideally, the equations should have been estimated with a dummy 
for each country. However, given that there were 41 countries, we decided to group 
the countries as follows: 
(i)  OECD English speaking countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, UK, and USA). 
(ii)  OECD Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). 
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(iii)  OECD West European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland). 
(iv)  OECD East European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia. 
(v)  Other OECD countries. (Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey). 
(vi)  OECD Partner countries (Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Leichtenstein, 
Latvia, Macao, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Serbia). 
  The results show that, with the OECD partner countries taken as the residual 
option, all the following OECD groups had positive coefficient estimates
5: East 
Europe (38 points), West Europe (29 points), Nordic countries (23 points), 
English-speaking countries (22 points).  However, the other OCED countries 
(which contained mathematically weak countries like Mexico and Turkey) 
reported a negative coefficient estimate of 16 points.  
  Family Type and Parental Occupation. The results showed very clearly that 
both family structure and parental occupation exercised a significant influence on 
student performance: ceteris paribus a student from a nuclear family was 
predicted to score approximately 6 more points, on average, than a student from a 
single parent family while students whose parents were high skilled white collar 
workers were predicted to score an average of 29 more points than students whose 
parents were low skilled blue collar workers. 
   This parental advantage persisted for students whose parents were lower down 
the occupational ladder: students whose parents were low skilled white collar 
workers were predicted to score 12 more points than students whose parents were 
low skilled blue collar workers while students whose parents were high skilled 
                                                 
5 Meaning that, ceteris paribus, their average scores were higher than the OCED partner average by the 
coefficient estimate. 
  13 
blue collar workers were predicted to score 2 more points than students whose 
parents were low skilled blue collar workers. 
   Both these results are consistent with received wisdom: Machin and Vignoles 
(2004) have drawn attention to the links between educational achievement and 
parental class; Gordon (1996) has argued that the current rates of success   in 
the GCSE exams in Britain (taken at the age of 16) are associated with   locations 
away from inner cities and the reason for this is the high concentration of lone 
parent families in inner cities.  
  Years of Schooling and Language at Home.  The effect on scores of how 
well educated students’ parents were was significant, but weak. A student, one of 
whose parents had received 17 years of parental schooling (approximately 
equivalent to a Master’s degree) was predicted to score approximately only two 
more points than a student with 10 years of parental schooling (approximately 
equivalent to leaving at age 16).  This suggests that, once parental occupational 
class was controlled for, there was not much additional role for the influence of 
parental educational.  
  Similarly, the language spoken at home did exert a large and significant effect 
on student scores: students, for whom the language used by the family at home 
was different from the language used for the test, scored an average of 16 fewer 
points compared to students for whom the language used by the family at home 
was the same as the language used for the test. 
The School Environment. The environment at school affected student 
performance in a number of ways: 
1.  First, and most obvious, was the time which the school devoted to instruction 
in mathematics. There was a very clear correlation between student 
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performance and the time spent on mathematics. For example, compared to the 
average score of students in the highest quartile with respect to instruction 
time:  ceteris paribus the average score of students in the lowest quartile of 
instruction time was 18 points lower; the average score of students in the 
second quartile of instruction time students was 10 points lower, and the 
average score of students in the third quartile of instruction time was 8 points 
lower. 
2.   Second, our results clearly showed that classroom discipline mattered. The 
effective learning of mathematics depended not just on the time devoted to is 
study but also on classroom management which sought to create a good 
learning environment in the classroom through high standards of discipline. 
Ceteris paribus compared to the average score of students who enjoyed the 
highest level of classroom discipline, students in the lowest quartile for the 
level of discipline in the classroom scored, on average, 31 fewer points. Nor 
was this poorer performance confined to the lowest level of discipline: 
students in the second quartile for the level of discipline in the classroom 
scored approximately 21 fewer points than students in the highest quartile, 
while students in the third quartile for the level of discipline in the classroom 
scored approximately 11 fewer points (compared to students in the highest 
quartile). 
3.  Third, the school could have been instrumental in making students interested 
in mathematics and motivating them to do well.
6  Of these two factors, once 
interest in mathematics had been controlled for, motivation did not have much 
of a role. Compared to the average score of students with the highest level of 
                                                 
6 Though, in addition to the school, several factors –including, home, friends – could influence interest 
and motivation. 
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interest in mathematics, the average score of students with lowest level of 
interest was 27 points lower but, compared to the average score of students 
with the highest level of motivation to study mathematics, the average score of 
students with lowest level of motivation was only 4 points lower. 
4.     Fourth, the school had an influence on student scores through the choice of 
appropriate teaching and learning strategies. However, it must be admitted that 
after controlling for the other school factors, 1-3 above, the influence of 
learning strategies on student performance was weak.  
  The results relating to school environment have obvious implications for the 
efficiency with which schools are run. In this connection, Bee and Dolton (1985) 
offer evidence that there may be economies of scale to be reaped from having 
larger schools.
7   
  The Home Environment: The results clearly pointed to the importance of 
computing resources at home as an aid to proficiency in mathematics. Students in 
the lowest quartile for the availability of computing resources at home scored, on 
average, approximately 47 points fewer than students in the highest quartile while 
students in the second quartile for the availability of computing resources at home 
scored approximately 23 points less than students in the highest quartile.   
Interestingly, there was hardly any difference in the average scores of students in 
the third and fourth quartiles of computing facilities thus suggesting that the 
marginal benefit of better facilities diminished very rapidly.   
   Non-computing resources - for example, in the form a quiet, separate place to 
study - were also important in influencing student scores. Students in the lowest 
quartile for the availability of other resources at home scored approximately 31 
                                                 
7 See also Dolton (1991) for a study of the efficient provision of compting services in UK universities. 
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fewer points than students in the highest quartile; students in the second quartile 
for the availability of other resources at home scored approximately 15 fewer 
points than students in the highest quartile. With respect to non-computing 
resources, there was a 10 point difference in the average scores of students in the 
third and fourth quartiles of non-computing facilities suggesting that the marginal 
benefit of better non-computing facilities did not diminish as rapidly as did the 
marginal benefit of better computing facilities. 
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6.  Conclusion 
The proportion of mathematically weak students was lowest (3 percent or less)  
in Finland, Korea, the Netherlands, Macao, Canada, the Czech Republic, and Hong 
Kong and highest (over 50 percent) in Tunisia, Brazil, and Indonesia.  At the other 
end of the scale, the proportion of mathematically strong students was highest (25 
percent or more) in Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Belgium, Liechtenstein, and the 
Czech Republic.  
In terms of the determinants of the point score, the strongest influences 
(defined as effecting, at least, a10 point increase in the point score) on mathematical 
performance – and in which where policy could play little or no role - were social 
class) and students being non-native language speakers .The areas in which schooling 
policy could have an effect were the amount of mathematical instruction at school and 
the level of classroom discipline. In terms of the home environment, the availability of 
a computer was important but equally important was the availability of non-
computing facilities (quiet place to study, books etc.). Indeed, as the results showed 
the marginal benefit of computing facilities diminished much more rapidly than the 
marginal benefit from non-computing facilities.  
A very important factor for high mathematical achievement is an interest in 
mathematics and here a number of factors – employment opportunities, school, home, 
friends – need to coalesce to create, sustain, and enhance interest in mathematics.  
There is, therefore, evidence from this analysis of the PISA data that if policy 
makers wish to improve the level of mathematical ability of their 15 year olds, then a 
sensible policy regime would be to: (i)  increase the amount of mathematical 
instruction at school and classroom discipline in general, (ii) increase the availability 
of computers at home (such as laptop borrowing schemes), (iii) increase the 
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availability of other educational resources at home (such as by encouraging the 
borrowing of library books, CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs and other educational material), 
(iv) take measures to develop an higher level of interest in Mathematics. 
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Table 1 
Equity Sensitive Assessment Scores in Mathematics of 15 year-olds, by Country 
 















   ε=0  ε=1  ε=2     
1. Hong Kong  4,478  555.9 
(0.095) 
547.1  537.2  1  1  1 
2. Finland  5,796  542.8 
(0.083) 
536.8  530.4  2  2  2 
3. Netherlands  3,992  542.1 
(0.094) 
534.3  525.9  3  3  3 
4. Korea  5,444  540.7 
(0.093) 
533  524.8  4  4  4 
5. Liechtenstein  332  536.5 
(0.100) 
527.4  517.5  5  5  5 
6. Czech Rep  6,320  535.0 
(0.102) 
526.1  516.8  6  6  6 
7. Japan  4,707  533.5 
(0.102) 
524  513.5  7  7  7 
8. Belgium  8,796  533.2 
(0.111) 
521.9  509.3  8  8  8 
9. New Zealand  4,511  525.6 
(0.103) 
516.6  507  9  9  10 
10. Macao  1,250  522.8 
(0.092) 
515.6  508.1  10  10  9 
11.Australia  12,551  522.3 
(0.102) 
513.3  503.6  11  12  12 
12. Canada  27,953  521.4 
(0.091) 
514.3  506.9  12  11  11 
13. Switzerland  8,420  518.2 
(0.100) 
509.7  500.6  13  13  13 
14. Iceland  3,350  515.1 
(0.095) 
507.4  499.2  14  14  14 
15.  France  4,300  514.7 
(0.096) 
506.9  498.6  15  15  15 
16. UK  9,535  514.4 
(0.097) 
506.5  498.1  16  16  16 
17. Denmark  4,218  513.6 
((0.096) 
505.9  497.6  17  17  17 
18. Austria  4,597  511.9 
(0.098) 
503.9  495.5  18  18  18 
19. Germany  4,660  508.4 
(0.108) 
498.4  487.6  19  20  21 
20. Sweden  4,624  508.0 
(0.101) 
499.3  489.8  20  19  20 
21. Ireland  3,880  504.7 
(0.092) 
497.8  490.6  21  21  19 
22. Slovakia  7,346  504.2 
(0.100) 
495.9  487.1  22  22  22 
23. Italy  11,639  496.0 
(0.102) 
487.3  477.7  23  25  25 
24. Norway  4,064  495.6 
(0.101) 
487.4  478.8  24  24  24 
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25. Spain  10,791  494.8 
(0.094) 
487.6  479.8  25  23  23 
26. Luxembourg  3,923  493.5 
(0.101) 
485.2  476.6  26  26  26 
27. Poland  4,383  489.0 
(0.100) 
481.1  472.7  27  27  27 
28. Hungary  4,765  488.6 
(0.104) 
480  470.9  28  28  29 
29. Latvia  4,627  486.2 
(0.097) 
478.8  471.1  29  29  28 
30. USA  5,456  481.5 
(0.107) 
472.6  463.3  30  30  30 
31. Russian Fed  5,974  472.4 
(0.105) 
463.9  455.2  31  31  31 
32. Portugal  4,608  465.2 
(0.102) 
457.4  449.2  32  32  32 
33. Greece  4,627  440.9 
(0.115) 
431.2  420.9  33  33  33 
34. Serbia  4,405  436.3 
(0.106) 
428.6  420.5  34  34  34 
35. Turkey  4,855  426.7 
(0.128) 
415.7  404.8  35  35  36 
36. Thailand  5,236  422.7 
(0.107) 
415.1  407.5  36  36  35 
37. Uruguay  5,835  413.0 
(0.137) 
400.5  387.2  37  37  38 
38. Mexico  29,983  405.4 
(0.104) 
398.3  390.8  38  38  37 
39. Indonesia  10,761  361.5 
(0.113) 
354.1  346.5  39  39  39 
4.0Brazil  4,452  360.4 
(0.143) 
348.6  336.3  40  40  41 
41 Tunisia  4,721  359.3 
(0.121) 
351  342.5  41  41  40 
 
Figures in parentheses are Gini coefficients
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Table 2 
Rates of Mathematical Weakness of 15-year olds, by Country
*, 
By Descending Order 
Country  Head Count 
Ratio (%) 
Tunisia  52.2 
Brazil  51.5 
Indonesia  50.5 
 Uruguay  30.2 
 Mexico  26.3 
Turkey  25.8 
Thailand  21.4 
 Greece  18.4 
 Serbia  17.8 
Italy  12.2 
Portugal  10.5 
Russian Fed  9.9 
USA  9.3 
Germany  7.4 
Hungary  7.1 
Luxembourg  6.6 
Latvia  6.4 
Belgium  6.1 
Poland  6 
Norway  5.8 
Spain  5.6 
 Sweden  5.4 
 Slovakia  5.1 
Switzerland  4.5 
Australia  4.4 
France  4.4 
 Japan  4.4 
Liechtenstein  4.2 
New Zealand  4.2 
Austria  4.1 
 Iceland  3.9 
UK  3.9 
Denmark  3.8 
 Ireland  3.8 
Hong Kong  3 
Czech Rep  2.8 
Canada  2.7 
Macao  2.6 
Netherlands  2.5 
Korea  2.2 
Finland  1.2 
All Countries  12.2 
 
* Proportion of students at the lowest level of mathematical proficiency. 
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Table 3 
Rates of Mathematical Strength of 15-year olds, by Country
* 
By Descending Order 
Country  Head Count 
Ratio (%) 
Hong Kong  32.4 
Netherlands  27.4 
Belgium  26.9 
Liechtenstein  25.3 
Czech Rep  25.1 
Korea  23.8 
 Japan  23.6 
Finland  22.3 
New Zealand  20.7 
Australia  19.3 
 Macao  17.2 
 Switzerland  17.1 
Germany  16.1 
Canada  16 
France  15.1 
UK  15.1 
Sweden  14.8 
Iceland  14.7 
Denmark  14.6 
Austria  14.5 
Slovakia  12.9 
 Ireland  10.8 
Italy  10.7 
Norway  10.7 
Hungary  9.7 
Luxembourg  9.7 
Poland  8.9 
USA  8.6 
Spain  8.1 
Latvia  7.7 
Russian Fed  6.8 
Portugal  4.8 
Turkey  4.7 
Greece  3.1 
Uruguay  2.6 
Thailand  2 
Serbia  2 
Brazil  0.9 
Mexico  0.36 
Indonesia  0.11 
Tunisia  0.11 
All Countries  11.8 
 
* Proportion of students at the highest two levels of mathematical proficiency. 
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Table 4 
Regression Estimates for Explaining Predicted Scores in Mathematics 
Family Type (residual- other type):   
Single parent family  13.24*** 
  (11.56) 
Nuclear Family  18.65*** 
  (17.08) 
Mixed Family  15.02*** 
  (11.48) 
Highest Occupational Class of Parent (residual blue collar 
low skilled): 
 
White Collar, high skilled  28.60*** 
  (42.87) 
White Collar, low skilled  12.15*** 
  (17.70) 
Blue Collar, high skilled  1.70** 
  (2.34) 
Highest Educational Attainment of parent:    
Years of Schooling  1.75*** 
  (8.29) 
(Years of Schooling)
2  0.007 
  (0.77) 
Language at home if different from test language  -15.61*** 
  (15.89) 
Minutes of Mathematical Instruction at School (residual – 
fourth quartile): 
 
Minutes: lowest quartile  -17.85*** 
  (32.59) 
Minutes: second quartile   -9.54*** 
  (14.14) 
Minutes: third quartile   -7.62*** 
  (13.66) 
Computing facilities at home (residual – fourth quartile):   
Facilities: lowest quartile  -46.91*** 
  (66.05) 
Facilities: second quartile  -22.83*** 
  (31.05) 
Facilities: third quartile  -1.51** 
  (3.15) 
Low home Educational Resources:  -2.92*** 
  (6.20) 
Home Resources (residual – fourth quartile):   
Resources: lowest quartile  -30.86*** 
  (38.45) 
Resources: second quartile   -14.46*** 
  (24.27) 
Resources: third quartile   -9.68*** 
  (15.95) 
  28 
Interest in mathematics (residual – fourth quartile):    
Interest: lowest quartile  -27.26*** 
  (49.91) 
Interest: second quartile   -17.28*** 
  (35.60) 
Interest: third quartile   -8.95*** 
  (14.52) 
Motivation (residual – fourth quartile):   
Motivation: lowest quartile  -4.13** 
  (6.16) 
Motivation: second quartile   -2.19 
  (4.17) 
Motivation: third quartile   -2.57*** 
  (4.20) 
Learning Strategies (residual – elaboration learning 
strategies): 
 
Memorisation/rehearsal learning strategies  1.01** 
  (2.37) 
Control learning strategies  3.57*** 
  (7.95) 
Discipline in classroom (residual – fourth quartile):   
Discipline: lowest quartile  -31.20*** 
  (53.26) 
Discipline: second quartile   -20.74*** 
  (40.89) 
Discipline: third quartile   -10.78*** 
  (18.91) 
Student’s grade:  29.66*** 
  (93.32) 
Country-specific variables (residual – OECD partner 
countries): 
 
OECD country: english speaking  22.23*** 
  (35.25) 
OECD Nordic countries  23.12*** 
  (29.18) 
OECD Western Europe  28.92*** 
  (48.55) 
OCED Eastern Europe  38.49*** 
  (51.75) 
OECD Others  -16.19*** 
  (22.49)) 
Intercept  502.18*** 
  (271.93) 
Observations  186612 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.346 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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